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Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of 
Macroeconomic Regime 
The experience of Argentina during the Great Depression provides an ideal 
historical laboratory for the investigation of macroeconomic stability and policy 
choice in a small open economy under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
As in recent developing-country experiences-including  examples of con- 
temporary currency boards very similar to Argentina's institutions of the early 
twentieth century-the  essential question is:  what happens if you  employ a 
currency board and there is  an external crash or deflation threat?  This was 
the nature of the crisis in the 1930s for many countries, and the same poten- 
tial problem has affected Argentina, Hong Kong, and other countries in the 
1990s. What should they do today? To inform that question we ask What  did 
Argentina do in the past? 
The Great Depression began in Argentina in the late 1920s.  Like many 
countries of the periphery, Argentina was exposed to the commodity lottery and 
the terms of trade worsened in the 1920s.' By December 1929,  the balance-of- 
payments crisis was severe and the exchange rate was left to float after a mere 
two-year resumption of the gold standard. 
Recovery began in 1931 as  output grew for the first time in several years. 
By 1934-35  output had regained its 1929 level. Assigning fiscal policy any re- 
sponsibility for the recovery is implausible: by any measure fiscal policy actually 
tightened during the early 1930s, as in many other Latin American countries 
and the United States. 
However, in monetary policy actions from 1929 to 1935 we see evidence 
of a change of regime.  Many commentators see the creation of the central 
bank (Banco Central) in 1935 as the main monetary policy event of the 1930s 
in Argentina.  We instead emphasize the remarkable decision of the Conver- 
sion Office to begin rediscounting in April 1931 and so forge an independent 
monetary policy.  In many ways, we would argue, the Central Bank merely 
1. Diaz Alejandro (1983);  Kindleberger (1986). 
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rubber-stamped this new macroeconomic policy regime and continued its op- 
erations after 1935.2 
The  Argentine recovery was complete by 1935; and the only pre-1935 change 
in regime that could be assigned a role in ending the Argentine Great Depres- 
sion was the action of the Conversion Office. Yet, did it make a difference? We 
argue that the change of monetary regime was essential to Argentina’s recovery 
in that it helped avert a devastating collapse of prices, and, potentially, of output 
in 1931-33.  Instead offollowing the United States and other countries into this 
abyss, Argentina’s regime shift destroyed deflationary expectations. Previously 
extremely high real interest rates were permanently lowered. 
In other ways, though, policy was still limited by orthodox thinking.  Ster- 
ilizations offset gold outflows but never counteracted them. This leads to an 
important distinction:  Temin has argued that recovery from the Depression 
came through two channels. First, a direct injection of liquidity could lower in- 
terest rates and stimulate aggregate demand, something he termed the “Keynes 
effect.” Second, a decisive change in monetary regime could convince agents to 
discard their pessimistic expectations of deflation, with favorable implications 
for economic activity via  lower ex ante real interest  rates, improved balance 
sheets and asset quality, and so on, termed the “Mundell effe~t.”~ 
Although two escape routes existed, only one was used-but  it was enough 
to avert disaster. Argentina was still a prisoner of its intellectual and economic 
history, and fear of inflation was still an issue in the midst of slump, as in other 
countries. The  Conversion Office, though willing to follow Prebisch‘s plan, was 
not willing to push it as far as it might. There was no “Keynes”  effect at work, 
no large money injection to stimulate aggregate demand as a device to end the 
Depression more quickly. The channel through which the change in monetary 
regime had real effects was via the destruction of deflationary expectations, the 
“Mundell” effect. 
Hence we think that the institutional change heralded by the rejection of an 
old orthodoxy was just as essential to recovery from the Great Depression in 
the periphery as in the core! 
2. In substantive terms, we would argue that the main contribution of the central bank was to put 
in place a rescue package for the financial sector-by  saving the Banco de la Nacion-using 
the proceeds of a large gold revaluation (depreciation). See Salama (1997, p.  21). 
3. Temin (1989) noted the impact of these two effects in the 1930s recovery in the core countries, 
and he too stressed the importance of the Mundell effect and the change of expectations that 
followed the change of regime.  See also Eichengreen  (1992a; 1992b). The U.S. experience 
under Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt is a classic example of such 
a regime shift; see Temin and Wigmore (1990); and Romer (1992). 
4. Cross-sectional reduced form analysis of the impact of devaluation on recovery was provided 
by Campa (1990), following Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). Other studies in this vein include 
Bernanke and James (1991), and Obstfeld and Taylor (1998). This chapter is perhaps more 
ambitious in that we focus on a single case-study and examine the structural  details of monetary 
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Contours of the Argentine Great Depression 
The Great Depression marked the end of an epoch where free trade and inte- 
gration into external capital markets served as the main strategies for economic 
growth in Latin American countries? For Argentina, although economic prob- 
lems had retarded economic growth since 1914,  there was a pressure to stand by 
the old liberal orthodoxy. Even during and after the worst recession in Argen- 
tine history, during the First World War, few policymakers seriously questioned 
the return to orthodoxy as the goal for the 1920s, to rebuild an economic or- 
der predicated on openness in markets and adherence to the gold standard as 
a monetary rule.‘  This view was only broken as  the threat of an even worse 
international economic collapse loomed in the early 1930s. 
Selected data in Table 9.1 show the impact of the Great Depression on the 
Argentine economy. From 1929  to 1932,  Argentina imported severe deflation- 
ary pressures from the international economy. If one were to judge by its trade 
exposure, Argentina was one of the most vulnerable economies in the presence 
of such sizeable foreign shocks-shocks  that, in addition to pure deflation, also 
included fierce terms of trade declines as countries took their hits in the “com- 
modity lottery.’” The external terms of trade declined by 24 percent and the 
foreign (U.S.) price level fell by 26 percent. 
In this context it is astonishing that the Argentine Great Depression was 
so mild and short-lived by international standards. Hence, the notion that an 
important change in economic policy took place-and  saved Argentina from 
more pronounced suffering-deserves  close scrutiny. As can be gleaned from 
Table 9.1, from peak to trough (1929 to 1932), the domestic real output fell 
by “only” 14  percent and had even surpassed its 1929 level already by 1935. 
Deflation, a curse to avoid in the interwar period, was only about 6 percent (in 
cumulative terms) in the same period. 
The  behavior of output and prices compares favorably,  say, to North American 
gold-standard  countries such as the United States and Canada:  they had an 
overall decline from peak to trough of more than 30 percent in real activity, 
and more than 20 percent in price level.8  The  Argentine performance was also 
very good by the standards of the periphery in general, and Latin America in 
particular. In the same 1929-32 period, Mexico’s prices and output fell by 19 
percent, Chile’s real output by 27 percent, and Brazil’s by 28 percent. 
We note here that currency depreciations were not always directly correlated 
with the ability to avoid a slump. For example, in Brazil there was a 66 percent 
5. Diaz Alejandro (1983; 1984). 
6. On the post-1914 slowdown, see Taylor (1992) and Chapter 7. 
7. On these deflations, see Kindleberger (1986); Temin (1989); Eichengreen (1992a).  On the 
commodity lottery see Diaz Alejandro (1984).  For a discussion of the general experience of 
the periphery in the 1920s with terms-of-trade  shocks see Kindleberger (1986). 
8. The data are from Mitchell (1992; 1993). Table 9.1. Contours of  the Argentine Great Depression 
A. Nominal Variables 
Banks’ 
Money  Gold  Domestic  Money  Exchange  Price  Wage  Land  Discount 
Year  Base  Stock  Credit  Su~olv  Rate  Level  Index  Prices  Rate (%) 
1913  823  530  293  1,687  2.35  100  100  100  5.4 
1928  1,406  1,113  293  4,717  2.32  131  180  296  6.3 
1929  1,247  954  293  4,652  2.35  127  178  293  6.9 
1930  1,261  968  293  4,660  2.70  122  166  238  6.9 
1931  1,245  593  652  4,149  3.40  118  155  260  7.2 
1932  1,339  584  755  4,116  3.83  119  146  237  7.1 
1933  1,214  561  653  4,061  3.18  114  139  210  6.1 
1934  1,172  561  610  4,078  3.89  130  136  196  5.5 
1935  1,647  1,354  293  4,180  3.75  128  147  185  5.4 
1936  1,685  1,528  157  4,611  3.55  131  153  217  5.6 
1937  1,679  1,422  257  4,922  3.28  150  159  252  5.2 
1938  1,615  1,296  319  4,811  3.86  140  160  271  5.3 
1939  1,796  1,396  400  4,960  4.27  143  166  256  5.8 
1940  1,810  1,329  481  5,050  4.30  163  176  248  5.8 
B. Real Variables 
Terms  Real  Govt. 
of  Exch.  Components of GDP  Deficit/ 
Year  Trade  Rate  Q  C  G  I  X  M  GDP(%) 
1913  100  100  4,640  4,322  204  579  1,805  2,270  0.8 
1928  99  121  7,780  6,549  406  900  2,901  2,991  1.7 
1929  YO  126  8,146  6,781  425  1,029  2,847  3,048  2.3 
1930  88  144  7,784  6,829  408  871  2,100  2,533  4.3 
1931  65  165  7,216  5,248  393  533  2,871  1,651  2.7 
1932  68  162  6,966  5,092  393  374  2,636  1,282  1.8 
1933  64  139  7,309  5,723  415  418  2,474  1,506  1.7 
1934  79  159  7,912  6,085  447  554  2,546  1,584  1.8 
1935  79  153  8,275  6,187  538  691  2,754  1,836  1.2 
1936  96  148  8,336  6,249  565  824  2,491  1,870  1.7 
1937  110  121  8,964  7,145  612  748  2,911  2,381  2.4 
1938  101  151  8,979  7,703  634  824  1,963  2,251  2.4 
1939  89  162  9,337  7,271  668  691  2,501  1,755  3.6 
1940  91  145  9,486  7,588  672  637  2,071  1,461  2.7 
Notes: All nominal quantities are millions of paper pesos; real quantities are millions of 1913 
pesos; ratios are percent; exchange rate is paper pesos per US. dollar; all other series are indices 
with 1913=100. The  components of output are, in order, total output (Q),  private consumption 
(C), government spending (G),  private investment (I),  exports (X),  and imports (M). 
Sources;  See Appendiw 1; Baiocco (1937); IEERAL (1986); della Paolera and Ortiz (1995). 192  Straining at the Anchor 
depreciation of its currency, in Mexico 47 percent, while the Argentine paper 
peso declined by 63 percent with respect to the gold dollar? 
We think it is important here to distinguish between a country choosing to 
depreciate as a regime switch versus beingforced to depreciate in a crisis. There is 
an enormous difference between: (a) letting the currency depreciate as a mean 
to restore equilibrium in the money market; and (b) installing a new policy 
regime a la Sargent that changes expectations and alters the course of economic 
decisions."  If, in the 1930s, Argentina were free to choose (or not choose) a 
full-fledged change in its monetary regime, and if, as we argue, this was as  a 
proactive political-economy decision, then policymakers must have had a lot of 
room for maneuver. 
Indeed they did. FromTable 9.1 we note that around 1930, almost 80 percent 
of the money base was backed with gold-a  backing ratio much higher than in 
any other gold standard country, and a symptom, as we shall see, of Argentina's 
thirty years of adherence to an especially strict currency-board regime.  The 
massive gold stock was critical, however, even after suspension. By using the 
gold to service external debt obligations the government could maintain a very 
orthodox fiscal policy. Argentina did not default on foreign debts in the 1930s: 
a very unusual feat for a peripheral country. In this way a new policy mix was 
chosen: "sound finance" in the realm of fiscal affairs, and, at the same time, an 
unorthodox fiduciary monetary regime. The domestic credit component of the 
money base, frozen for 32 years by the law of 1899, increased to such an extent 
that it already accounted for 62 percent of the money base by 1932. 
Other macroeconomic responses stand out in Table 9.1.  Investment fell by 
about one half in 1929-31 and by another third in 1932. Private consumption 
fell by about a quarter.  Both shifts greatly exceeded the fall in output.  This 
was possible only because an export recovery and massive import compression 
provided most of the adjustment." As we shall see, agents began to clamor for 
a change in policies to redress the negative expectations that prevailed.  The 
dramatic declines in output, investment, and consumption ceased, and then 
reversed, after 1932.  It seems the authorities were successful in the regime 
change, stabilizing the price level and real exchange rate.  Export growth and 
sustained import compression assisted recovery. 
9. In larger samples nominal devaluations were correlated with economic recovery in the 1930s. 
For the core this was shown by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and the idea was extended to 
Latin America by Campa (1990). 
10. See Sargent (1983). He applied the idea of regime change to the end of large inflations in 
history. Temin and Wigmore (1990) applied the idea to the end of deflationary episodes such 
as the Great Depression. 
11. These  patterns of adjustment were common in the 1930s depression in Latin America, despite 
subsequent beliefs in the structuralist and import-substitution schools that the structure of 
the economy was inflexible and exports could not generate economic expansion. See Twomey 
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In short, by 1933 Argentina had circumvented the most devastating effects 
of the World Depression. Did policy choices make a difference? 
The  Interwar Gold Standard: Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy 
Some authors have characterized the Argentine Great Depression as a definite 
“blessing”-in  the sense of creating an opportunity to adopt new economic 
policies and institutions in the face of widespread pressure from external gov- 
ernments and economic advisors to stick to orthodox policies. This new insti- 
tutional regime, by deviating from the prevailing rnentafiti  of the orthodox gold 
standard, is what could have insulated the domestic economy from the dismal 
global scenario.12 
Such a regime would have been hard to envisage just a few years earlier given 
Argentina’s position as a periphery economy and its struggle, over more than a 
century, to securely establish credible monetary, fiscal, and financial institutions. 
The long effort to adhere to orthodoxy followed from a political consensus in 
which few doubted the rewards that would (and did) accrue to Argentina in 
return for embracing globalization in the late nineteenth century and playing 
by the internationally approved “rules of the game.” Free movements of cap- 
ital, labor, and goods were a key ingredient in Argentina’s pre-1914 success. 
Against this backdrop, we can see what extraordinary intellectual and techno- 
cratic obstacles policymakers had to surmount in the 1930s before they could 
effect a change in the macroeconomic regime, and, in doing so, depart from 
the prevailing orthodoxy even ahead of most of the developed countries of the 
core.13 
Fiscal Poli y 
We discuss fiscal policy first because of the important  constraints it put on 
monetary policy, even though in itself it was not an area of regime change at all. 
The historical record shows no shift in Argentina’s basic orthodox fiscal stance- 
of seeking to maintain budget balance-even  during the worst years of the Great 
Depression. This is not a surprising discovery  Even in the economies of the 
core, the power of fiscal policy was not unleashed to insulate economies from the 
12. See, for example, Diaz Alejandro (1983) and Ortiz (1998).  Diaz Alejandro states:  “Once 
upon a time foreign money doctors roamed Latin America prescribing fixed exchange rates 
and passive gold exchange standard monetary rules. Bankers followed in their footsteps, from 
the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Daiquiri.. ..This paper will chronicle some of the ways 
various Latin American economies coped with them. It will be seen that the performance of 
several economies was remarkably good, under the circumstances.” 
13. Argentina was one of the first countries to suspended the interwar gold standard in December 
1929. At around the same time Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay suspended. The first 
suspensions in the core were Britain and Scandinavia in 1931, the same year other Latin 
American countries suspended. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985); Campa (1990). Cartoon 9.1. I-ri-go-yen-Balance  ComercialNegatiwo-  Bqa  del PesoArgentino-Deudas  Impagas 
-  Intranyuilidad  General -  Desorientacion.  Orulista-2Hasta  donde  lee? 
Ministro de Hacienda -No  weo mtis gue laprimera linea. Oculista -  Tiem  que usar anteojos, lo mismo 
que sus  colegas.  ([On the optician’s chart:]  I-ri-go-yen -  Negative Trade Balance -  Fall ofThe 
Argentine Peso -Unpaid  Debts -  General Unrest -  Disorientation. [Dialog:] At  the optician’s 
office. Optician -  How far can you read?  Economy Minister -  I can’t see more than the first 
line. Optician -  You have to use spectacles, the same as your colleagues.) 
Notes; In  a cartoon that appeared shortly  before the coup by General Uriburu, Irigoyen’s government 
is heavily criticized for doing too little as the international and domestic economic crises worsen. 
Source:  Carasy caretas, aiio 32, no.  1625, November 23,1929. 
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recession. For example, it is hard to find any evidence of  full  employment deficits 
in the United States during the 1930s. Indeed, for many years, the net fiscal 
impact appeared to be c~ntractionary.’~  Moreover, if expansionary deficits were 
not an option for core countries in the 1930s-with  their developed taxation 
systems and fiscal sophistication-they  were, of course, still less of a feasible 
policy choice for countries at the periphery, given their much less developed 
government structures for managing, administering, and implementing large 
spending  program^.'^ 
The 1930s fiscal experience in Argentina accords with expectations.16  At the 
start of the interwar period customs taxes constituted a large share of revenues, 
as  is typical in all developing countries.”  Consequently, tax  revenues were 
cyclically correlated with trade conditions: during recessions, import contrac- 
tion was a standard response. Since government spending followed an upward 
trend, endogenous (although not, by definition full-employment)  deficits ap- 
peared in some of these recessions; and, indeed, temporary deficits were run up 
in the First World War and in 1921-22. 
The fiscal response in the 1930s was  not so forgiving.  High expenditures 
were run up in 1928-30 and drastically cut back during 1931-33, generating 
a big contractionary effect just as the economy fell into the Great Depression. 
Although customs taxes were falling in line with the trade crisis, total taxes were 
increasing.  President JosC  F.  Uriburu  (1930-32), like Hoover in the United 
States, was a fiscal conservative and sought orthodox budget balance.lX One 
important part of the package was a dramatic increase in direct taxes, in the 
form of income and wealth taxes, which rose from 25 million pesos (less than 
5 percent of all  revenues) in the 1920s, to 92 million (almost 15 percent) in 
1933. With a broad array of aggressive tax programs, the government raised 
taxes consistently every year after 1930 and closed the deficit from 240 million 
pesos in 1929, to  just 126 million in 1933 (Figure 9.1). Thus, far from pursuing 
expansionary fiscal policy via increasedfill-employment deficits, the Argentine 
fiscal response during the Great Depression was such as to generate not even 
increases in actual deficits, but rather a move toward surplus.19  So our search for 
14. Thus, for example, the classic Keynesian tool of macroeconomic management did not fail, but 
rather was never really used, as was famously pointed out by Brown (1956). This finding was 
further reinforced by the work of Peppers (1973); and Romer (1992). 
15. This was true of Latin America, where few countries in the 1930s were capable of developing 
new fiscal programs in response to thc Great Depression. Twomey (1983). 
16. Diaz Alejandro (1983, p.  21). 
17. Such taxes accounted for 199 million out of370 million pesos oftax revenues in 1913, or about 
54 percent. 
18. General Uriburu deposed President Irigoyen in September 1930 in the first coup d’  etat against 
the constitutional order in the twentieth century. 
19. We concur with Diaz Alejandro that “in short, there is no evidence that during the early 1930s 
the Argentine government sought to increase the full employment budget deficit as a means 
to compensate for the fall in aggregate demand” (Diaz Alejandro 1983, p. 22). 196  Straining at  thednchor 
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Notes andsourcest  See Appendix 1. 
a source of Argentine economic recovery must focus elsewhere, and we focus 
on the change in monetary regime. 
Curiously, fiscal orthodoxy and monetary tensions were two  sides of the 
same coin, and the link is critical to our understanding of Argentine policy 
choice.  Intense fiscal pressure was felt in many Latin American countries in 
1929-30.  Tax  revenues fell and foreign lenders refused to roll over debts in 
the worsening international climate.  Deflations and depreciations raised the 
burden of foreign-denominated  debt service. The Argentine deficit for 1930 
stood at 4.3 percent of output, a marked increase from previous years;  debt 
service had risen from 18  percent of the budget in 1930  to 29 percent in 1932.2' 
Many countries chose to default in this situation, but Argentina never wa- 
vered from its external sovereign debt obligations?'  With external default an 
anathema-and  attempts to raise new borrowings, depress imports, and boost 
tax revenues proving insufficient in the short run-the  only remaining option 
for servicing the debt was to draw on the last fiscal resource left to the govern- 
ment: the large gold stock sitting idle in the vaults of the Conversion Office. 
This course was taken, but the price for subscribing to this fiscally orthodox 
20. See Table 9.1 and Diaz Alejandro (1983, pp. 20-21). 
21. Why? A conventional interpretation is that Argentina maintained  debt service so as not to 
derail the Roca-Runciman tradingpact with Britain, understanding that British creditors could 
not be let down or else severe trade penalties might result from a diplomatic crisis. We offer 
another, perhaps more compelling, explanation: Argentina sought to maintain its reputation 
with foreign creditors to maintain access to capital markets, and was indeed successful in this 
respect during the 1930s.We discuss this issue in a later part of the paper where we focus on 
contemporary evidence. See also Lindert and Morton (1989) and Tomz (1998). Steering through the Great Depression 
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Months with  Months with 
All months  AG>O  AG  <O  Means 
Regime  Dates  b  s.e.  N  b  s.e.  N  b  s.e.  N  AG  AM 
Float  1914:8-19:12  1.00 .01  65  1.00 .01  37  -0.58 .83  5  6.74  6.74 
Gold  1900:2-14:7  1.00 .01  174  0.99 .02  87  0.99 .02  52  2.56  2.57 
Float  192O:l-27:ll  1.00 .06  95  1.00  .04  15  1.30 .39  8  1.90  1.90 
Float  193O:l-31:3  1.00 .OO  15  1.00 .OO  2  1.00 .OO  12  -4.42 -4.42 
Notes and sources:  See Appendix 1. Units of G (gold stock) and M  (money base) are millions 
of paper pesos, with G evaluated at parity of 2.27  paper pesos per gold peso.  Regression is of 
AM on AG,  using Ordinary Least Squares, and reporting coefficient 6,  standard error s.e., and 
sample size N, 
Gold  1927:12-29:12  1.00 .01  25  1.03 .03  9  1.00 .01  16  -4.43 -4.43 
Float  1931:4-35:4  0.05 .24  49  - - -  0.47 .43  13  -6.66  0.57 
response was to draw down the gold stock and, ips0 facto, the money base, given 
the mechanical rules of the currency board.  Thus a deflationary money con- 
traction was an inevitable but undesirable side-effect of the course chosen-at 
least as long as the Conversion Office played by its own rules. 
Monetary Policy 
In a pure gold standard regime, expansions and contractions of the nominal 
quantity of money should be exactly correlated with variations in the gold stock 
at the Conversion Office. For the 1900-1914 and the 1927-29 gold-standard 
periods, there was just such a one-to-one and rigid association between money 
and gold as shown by the data in Table 9.2 and Figure 9.2. More remarkably, 
there was even strict adherence to the rule from 1914 to 1927 during a long 
suspension of convertibility. 
In this period, many core countries witnessed inflations and hyperinflations, 
but Argentina maintained  a key element of orthodoxy.  There was  no wild 
recourse to money printing-for  example, to finance spending-even  though 
suspension offered an easy excuse and the exchange rate had drifted away from 
its anchor.  Indeed, drift in the exchange rate was unavoidable as most other 
countries abandoned their pegs from after 1914  until the mid-1920s. The ad- 
herence to orthodoxy was all the more remarkable given the enormous economic 
contraction in the years 1914-19 already noted. 
Argentina unilaterally did what it could to stick to orthodoxy and suspension 
ofconvertibility in 1914was  seen as just a temporary measure. After 1914  there 
were occasional outflows of gold for official purposes but these were still ac- 
companied by a strict application of the gold-for-peso rule. From 1914  to 1927 
the Conversion Office worked in a kind of asymmetric fashion: the monetary 
base augmented automatically when gold reserves increased but gold extrac- 
tions were rarely allowed. Consequently, in periods of demand pressure in the 
foreign-exchange market, notably in the recession of 1920-21, adjustment took 198  Straining at the Anchor 
Figure 9.2. Changes in Gold Stocks and the Money Base, 1900-1935 
Gold Standard  Float 1914:8-1919:12  Float 192O:l-1927:ll 
1900:2-1914:7 
60  -100 
Gold Standard  Float 193O:l-1931:3  Float 1931:4-1935:4 
1927:12-1929:12  (Caja rediscounts) 
0 
Notes andrources; See Table 9.2. The  horizontal axis is always AG,  the vertical axis is always 
AM.  Units for both are millions of paper pesos. The  45 degree line is shown. 
another form. The  quantity of base money remained unchanged, and there was 
a depreciation of the exchange rate (Figure 9.3)?’ However, it was the univer- 
sal belief of policymakers and market players &ke  that resumption at par was 
the only possible steady-state solution to the turbulence in the monetary and 
financial markets. How could this tension be resolved? 
A“one-way”  gold standard, as this has been called,  was still consistentwith the 
long-run goal of resumption at par, for a simple reason. During the boom years 
of 1900-1914, Argentina had built up a huge gold backing for the currency; 
from 1914 to the mid-1920s Argentina husbanded that stock carefully via the 
“one-way” devices of the Conversion Office.  By the mid-l920s, resumption 
still looked credible because this strategy left Argentina with much stronger 
backmg for the currency, at least as compared to many core countries, as the 
gold-exchange standard was built. Actions were geared to the monetization of 
22. Depreciation meant an increase in the paper-gold market exchange rate relative to the par value. Steering through the Great Depression  199 
Figure 9.3.  Nominal Exchange Rate Versus Parity, 1900-1940 
A 
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Nofes  andrources: See Appendix 1. Units are paper pesos per gold peso. The  thin line indicates the 
official parity, 2.27 until April 1935, and 4.96 from May 1935. 
gold inflows but officials were strict about keeping the gold-backing of money 
to a minimum of 78 percent in the turbulent 1920-25 ~ears.2~ 
What price did Argentina pay for this curious “one-way”  gold standard pol- 
icy?  Did the exchange rate rise well above par making resumption difficult? 
Not at all. The  most dramatic crisis in 1920-21 saw sudden declines in exports 
and the terms of trade.  Even so, the premium over par never went above 33 
per~ent.2~  In contrast, core European countries could only achieve such close 
convergence to prewar parity by the mid-1920s as they started to resume the 
gold standard. 
Several observers noted that European experiences with floating rates after 
1914  were dismal in the absence of a well-understood monetary “straight  jacket” 
to limit expansionary monetary policies,  with monetization often deriving from 
unsustainable fiscal ga~s.2~  Conditions in Argentina could not have been more 
different.  More orthodox than the core itself, this peripheral country, from 
1914 through to resumption  in 1927, in its rhetoric and actions, was  intent 
23. At the same time, core gold standard countries such as  Italy, Netherlands, Norway, or thc 
United States never surpassed a gold-cover ratio of 50 percent of the money base. 
24. In the opposite circumstance, of gold inflow pressure, Argentina was even more orthodox than 
other countries; in the 1918-19  postwar years, the paper peso strengthened well above par 
before the Conversion Office decided to permit and monetize incipient gold inflows. In 1918 
and 1919, the paper peso in terms of the gold peso was quoted at 2.14 and 2.2, well below the 
2.27 par value. 
25. See the fascinating article by Eichengreen and Temin (1997) that analyzes the policy debates 
over the resumption of the gold standard in core European and North American countries in 
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on the idea of resumption at parity. The regime in place was still essentially a 
metallic monetary regime. The  prevailing mentalit6 allowed no room for money 
issues not fully backed by gold. Historical experience with profligate monetary 
policies in the 1880s and before, and the inflation and economic chaos that 
resulted from such actions, lived on in the minds of Argentine policymakers. 
Based on legal developments, some might dispute the idea that from 1900 to 
1931  the country maintained a metallic regime. We can recall from the previous 
chapter that emergency laws were passed in August 1914  to overcome the severe 
financial crisis. The 1914 rediscount law contained two key measures. 
The first measure was intended to delegate to the Banco de la Nacion, a 
quasi-public bank, and the largest of all banks, the microeconomic responsi- 
bility to forestall liquidity problems in the financial system via the rediscount 
window. However, the action of rediscounting commercial paper through this 
first provision in the law could only effect a change in inside money, or banking 
money (M3),  and not in the monetary base (MO) which was controlled by the 
Conversion Office. 
The second provision of the law allowed the Conversion Office to rediscount 
commercial and government paper so long as gold backing stayed above a lower 
bound of 40 percent. In  the latter we see, as early as 1914, and just 15  years after 
the 1899 convertibility law, a clear innovation:  the design of an institutional 
capability that would permit the Conversion Office to delink gold and currency 
movements.  Was it used at all?  In the period to April 1931 the answer is: 
almost never.  With the exception of three months in the economic crisis of 
1925, the monetary authorities never issued fiduciary notes?6 
The evolution of the money base in Figure 9.4 clearly shows the actions of 
the monetary authorities during the years of the Conversion Office (January 
1900 to April 1935) and the first years of the Central Bank (May 1935 to De- 
cember 1940). The constancy of the fiduciary issue is immediately apparent as a 
component of the money base, and above it we see the gold-backed component: 
the strict gold-money rule applied until April 1931.2' For this reason we found 
the very strict correlations between gold and money seen in Figure 9.2. 
As we have noted, if gold had to be spent in a fiscal rearguard action, the tra- 
ditional operations of the Conversion Office would have led to a major adverse 
monetary shock, unless the rules of the game changed. They did: 
26 
27 
The conservatism of the Conversion Office contrasts with the more activist behavior of the 
Banco de la Naci6n.  The bank rediscounted commercial paper in a countercyclical fashion 
(Salama 1997). 
Except for asmall blip in 1925,  and a few other months (where lags kept gold and money slightly 
out of synchronization) there were no money issues not covered by gold at the Conversion 
Office.  Note that during the First World War, and to a lesser extent in the early 1930s, 
difficulties in shipping gold out of Europe meant that incipient gold inflows to Argentina were 
held in European vaults of the diplomatic missions (legaciones), but were the property of the 
Conversion Office. These were counted as gold backing, and are denoted separately. Figure 9.4. Composition of the Money Base, 1900-1940 
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Maintenance of  liquidity was  not  simply a  matter of ending convertibility.  On the 
one hand, even after the abandonment of the gold standard, some countries such as 
Argentina shipped gold abroad to service the external debt and sold foreign exchange 
to stem the currency depreciation. On the other hand, as early as 1931 South American 
monetary authorities began to adopt measures which Professor E. W. Kemmerer and Sir 
Otto Niemeyer would have found unsound. Thus, the Argentine Caja de Conversibn, 
whose old and only duty was  to exchange gold for domestic currency and vice versa, 
began in 1931 to issue domestic currency in exchange for private commercial paper. By 
1931 the old Caja even issued domestic currency against treasury paper?’ 
Gold inflows had long ceased at this point, but subsequent gold outflows 
for fiscal use were sterilized; and even when there were no gold movements 
the Conversion Office often unilaterally changed the nominal stock of money 
via redisco~nts.2~  Accordingly, we consider this the decisive regime change for 
Argentine economic policy, certainly during the Great Depression and possibly 
for the twentieth century as a whole. 
The basis of the monetary regime shifted from metallic to fiduciary in 1931. 
By the end of the year, after just nine months, fiat notes rediscounted by the 
Conversion Office rose from zero to as much as 30 percent of the monetary 
base. By 1932 the gold backing had already fallen from the targeted 78 percent 
in 1929 to 43 percent, a ratio only slightly above the lower limit allowed by law. 
In this context, it is instructive to examine expectations as revealed by the 
behavior of the foreign-exchange market. In 1930, the gold premium was never 
above 28 percent-still  below the 1923 mark.  However, after the authorities 
started to sterilized the fiscal outflow of gold in 1931 by rediscounting, the 
premium skyrocketed to 81 percent and never reverted to a lower value (Fig- 
ure 9.3). 
The  reaction of the foreign exchange market was a (very rapid) manifestation 
of beliefs that had changed: agents increasingly saw the delinking of gold and 
currency as a permanent phenomenon. Judging from Figure 9.2 they were right. 
For the 1931-35 period the average annual change in the gold stock was -6.7 
million paper pesos, but the average change in the quantity of money was +0.6 
million paper pesos. 
We will argue that this precocious heterodox approach by Argentina’s poli- 
cymakers helped avert a severe economic collapse. Yet, it was remarkable that 
they could effect such a dramatic change in regime given decades of adherence 
to orthodoxy. Where did their bold ideas originate? 
28. Diaz Alejandro (1983, pp. 16-17). 
29. The  rediscounts began under the auspices of the 1914 law and were augmented by a new series 
of rediscounts  of treasury paper  under the “Patriotic Loan” legislation of 1932.  These are 
included in the figure. Steering through the Great Depression 
The  Political Economy of  Reflation: A Deja-Vu in 1929? 
We  recall that the costly effects of deflation on the economywere nothing new in 
Argentine macroeconomic history. In the aftermath of the 1891  Baring Crisis, 
Argentine  authorities  had  assured international investors that convertibility 
would be resumed quickly and at par. It  was not to be. As we have noted, there 
arose a political-economy debate on whether a gold-standard regime should 
be restored at the original 1881 parity, or if, instead, convertibility should be 
pursued at the prevailing market rate, thus accommodating the devaluation. 
We  saw that the most important argument denouncing the damaging effects of 
deflation originated from the little-known Argentine political economist Silvio 
Gesell(l862-1930) in an article entitled “Monetary  Anemia.” 
The  influence of Gesell’s  ideas on negative expectations and deflationary traps 
was recognized in the 1930s by Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes.  In 
his book Stamp Scrip,  Fisher acknowledged Gesell’s innovative idea: 
Silvio Gesell, who died recently,  was a German businessman and quasi-economist.. .  .  In 
1890, while in Argentina, he proposed essentially that particular substitute for money 
which now bids fair to sweep [the United States] under the name of Stamp Scrip. Gesell 
before he died, accumulated a considerable following abroad; but it took the tortures of 
a depression to bring about any practical efforts to make use of his Stamp Scrip idea?” 
Keynes went recognized Gesell’s influence in the General Theory: 
The great puzzle of Effective Demand with which Malthus had wrestled vanished from 
economic literature.  You will not find it mentioned even once in the whole works of 
Marshall, Edgeworth and Professor Pigou, from whose hands the classical theory has 
received its most mature imbodiment. It could only live on furtively, below the surface, 
in the underworlds of Karl Man,  Silvio Gesell or Major Douglas.. . 
In a later chapter Keynes remarked that “it is convenient to mention at this 
point the strange, unduly neglected prophet Silvio Gesell whose work contains 
flashes of deep insight.. .”; he then expended a dozen pages explaining Gesell’s 
contribution to the theory of money and 
Gesell’s critique of a fixed nominal quantity of money as a suboptimal mon- 
etary rule was certainly influential in the 1899  decision to resume convertibility 
at a new parity. Yet, interestingly enough, he is barely mentioned by the other 
main influential intellectual figure in our story, Rad Prebisch.  Prebisch was 
the most influential and respected economist  and economic policymaker of 
the 1930s. He  was, perhaps, the only one who could challenge the prevailing 
mentalite‘ and conceive of a policy change to avoid the severe consequences of 
deflation in line with Gesell’s ideas.” 
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30. Fisher (1933b, pp. 17-18). 
31. Keynes (1935, pp. 32,353-58,  and 371-79). 
32. During the de facto government of General Uriburu, Raul Prebisch was the Undersecretary of 
Finance. Already, in 1921, he had written a brilliant article on the problems of the Argentine 
currency showing that he understood thc costly effects of deflation. See Prebisch (1922). 204  Straining at the Anchor 
An  important task for Prebisch was persuading other policymakers to come 
around to his position, and his recollection of one such lobbying effort shows 
how.  A crucial figure he had to persuade was Federico Pinedo, a politician 
and economist who at first viewed deviation from monetary orthodoxy with 
suspicion. In  an interview years later, Prebisch recalled the meeting: 
Prebitch:  I am going to give you an idea of how Federico Pinedo was converted to 
the idea of creating a Central Bank. As I have said, when the General Uriburu spoke 
about the convenience of studying the creation of a central bank, in the report I wrote, 
Pinedo, in a series of conferences, disputed the idea. And he did it  in a harsh manner. At 
the time, I knew him very little. But during the world depression there was a situation, 
when I was the Undersecretary of the Treasury, a catastrophic situation. The banking 
system was on the verge of collapse and we decided-I  had the idea-to  invoke an old 
rediscounting law that was never applied. The law was approved during the First World 
War, in the first week of panic that we experienced, and it allowed the Conversion Office 
to rediscount banking paper. We made it operational.. .. We stated that the rediscount 
law was to be applied.. .  . Then Pinedo, who was in the opposition to the Provisional 
Government, in spite of having been a revolutionary, enrolled with the Partido Socialista 
Independiente.. .  . He  came to see me, I have now a clear picture of that moment; he 
said: “Prebisch, what mistake are you going to make?” (u2Q.e  barbaridad van a hacer?B) 
He  was agitated.. .so nervous that he did not want to sit down.. .  .  I explained to him the 
critical situation of the Banco de la Nacion. The Banco de la Naci6n was the institution 
that administered the Clearing House. The money that the Banco de la Nacion had in 
the vaults was less than the cash at the Clearing House. That tells you about the gravity 
of the situation. 
Q:  In which period did this occur? 
Prebirth: This was in the year 1932-110,  in the year ’31, in the depth of the world 
Q: And at issue was the project to create the Central Bank? 
Prebisch:  No, no, no.  It was putting in motion the rediscounting law to allow the 
Conversion Office to rediscount. And Pinedo believed that we would provoke inflation. 
I explained to him for two hours. I did not hide any secret  ....  He  asked me a few questions 
and he started to become more calm. After two hours standing up I said: “Ok, Doctor 
Pinedo, you now know how is the situation.  What would you  do if you were in my 
shoes in the cabinet of the Ministry of Finance?” And he had the loyalty of saying, and 
this is why I admired him so much: “the same thing that you are proposing”. He  said 
nothing more. His criticism of the government ceased. For the first time he understood 
in the dramatic crisis that engulfed the country and the financial system. And he started 
to support the measures of the government.. .  . He convinced himself that there was no 
backtrack, that the Argentine monetary system based on the automatic exchange ofgold 
for paper and paper for gold could not function. But this was in the year 1931. Then 
1932 and 1933 elapsed and, when he was minister of Finance in 1934 he called me, and 
he asked me to draft the proposal for the creation of the Central Bank. ..?3 
With the leadership of Prebisch a consensus was reached  by the economic 
intelligentsia in Argentina in which they clearly understood that the time had 
depression. I gave him a huge amount of confidential information.. .. 
33. Our  own translation from Magariiios de Mello (1991,  pp. 108-109 and 110).  We also see here 
how very careful Prebisch was to distinguish the 1931 change in regime, as he saw it, from his 
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come to abandon the rigid constraints imposed by a metallic monetary regime. 
No one was to perceive this as a temporary political economy decision, but as a 
fundamental break from the past: but could it save the Argentine economy? 
Institutional Change: The  Impact of Monetary Policy 
In the discussion so far we  have found strong prima  facie evidence that if 
any policy actions mattered for Argentina’s economic recovery from the Great 
Depression, it was most likely monetary policies and the change of regime 
that were central. We now try to quantify the impact of these policies on the 
evolution of the macroeconomy in the 1930s using econometric techniques. 
The Model 
We construct a three-equation dynamic econometric model of exchange rates, 
prices, and interest rates. The system is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
on annual data for the period  1884 to  1941 and is used for counterfactual 
simulations of alternative monetary policies in the 1930~:~ 
The estimated model, shown in Table 9.3, looks reasonable. In  the first two 
equations, exchange rates and prices adjust in accord with PPP as they react to 
the lagged real exchange rate.  There is fast pass through in one period from 
money to exchange rates (a coefficient of0.25), but slower pass through to prices 
(a coefficient of 0.16), a common structure in open economy macromodels, 
reflecting fast adjustment in financial markets but more nominal rigidities in the 
34. The equations of the model are as follows: 
AlnEt  =  u1  +pl(L)(AInEtpl, AInPtpl) 
+yl(L)(AlnMt, AInPF)+S1(L)Inqt-l  +<it; 
+yz(L)(A In Mi,  A In PF) +  6z(L)  In qt-1  +  t2t; 
a3 +  83(L)(A InMt, A In Yt,  A 1nPt-1,it-1)  +  ~3~; 
AlnPt  =  u2 +pz(L)(AlnEt-l,  AlnPt-l) 
rt  = 
where Et  is the exchange rate in paper pesos per US. dollar, Pt  is the price level, Mt is the 
money base, P:  is the U.S. price level, yt =  In(EtP;/Pt)  is the log real exchange rate, it  is the 
nominal interest rate, rt =  it -  A In Pt  is the real interest rate, and Yt is real output. 
The first two  equations model adjustments of the real exchange rate as being driven by two 
forces: endogenous adjustment via the lags of E and P and the error correction term q; and 
exogenous adjustments via forcing terms M  and P*.  We treat the U.S. price level P*  as 
exogenous to the Argentine economy, and we impose PPP so that q is the relevant error 
correction term. We  also allow monetary policy effects, to the extent that they are orthogonal to 
y,  and any serial correlation terms, to have an impact. This might be viewed as “independent” 
components of monetary policy; for example, money innovations not, say, predicted via the 
price-specie-flow rule (that is, via  q).  Since our sample is 1884 to  1941, the bulk of these 
years (excluding 1900-1914 and 1927-29)  are years of inconvertibility, and the assumption of 
complete exogeneity of money is reasonable. The  final equation is a standard Mishkin interest 
rate forecasting  equation of the type used by Romer in her analysis of the United States. Great 
Depression.  It is used here in a similar form, with three lags found significant using a step 
down procedure. See Romer (1992); Mishkin (1992). Cartoon 9.2. EIfenomeno de /a Cusa Rosada. (The phenomenon of the Casa Rosada.) 
Notes:  Federico Pinedo is in command of creating the central bank.  On  stage, he turns gold into 
paper. In the box, President Justo and his ministers applaud the performance. 
Source:  Curusy caretas, vol. 38, no.  1901, March 9,1935. Steering through the Great Depression  207 
economy as a whole. Foreign prices pass through to domestic prices quickly, as 
one would expect in a small open economy. With noninstantaneous adjustment 
there  is  scope for monetary policy to effect real devaluations.  In the third 
equation, the real interest rate is  significantly affected by  money growth so 
monetary expansions can temporarily drive down real interest rates. 
The  Counterfactual 
Did monetary policies under a new regime end the Argentine Great Depres- 
sion? The  question contains implicit counterfactuals that needs to be examined: 
essentially, had the monetary regime not changed, what would have happened? 
Given the suspension of convertibility in 1929, and the imposition of exchange 
controls, the fiscal use of gold for debt service implies an exogenous path for 
the gold stock. This simplifies our analysis greatly as we do not have to model 
endogenous gold flows in a free market for foreign exchange. We  just have to 
consider counterfactual paths of money, and we study two cases. 
The  basic counterfactual (CF1) examines what would have happened absent 
the expansion of domestic credit begun by the Conversion Office in mid-1931. 
In the counterfactual, the sole movements of gold would have continued to 
be the fiscal use  of gold by the central government to service external debt: 
the currency board would not break the rules and attempt to sterilize the gold 
outflows by rediscounting. 
In a second and less harsh counterfactual (CF2) we permit the authorities 
to revalue gold, as actually happened, in 1935. But we allow no other forms 
of monetary expansion after 1935, and changes in money base are based on 
the actual path of gold and reserves at the Central Bank.  Thus, in CF1, we 
effectively imagine a world without a Central Bank.  In CF2, we effectively 
imagine a world without the Conversion Office rediscounts, but still allow the 
Central Bank to revalue gold. 
Both counterfactuals imply large shocks to the path of money (seeTable 9.1). 
From 1929 to 1934, MO  held constant at around 1,200 million pesos.  Gold 
stocks fell by almost half, from 954 million, to 561 million; but after 1931 do- 
mestic credit expanded from 293 million (its level since 1900)  and reached 610 
million in 1934,  almost exactly offsetting the gold loss. Thus, both counterfac- 
tuals would have implied a counterfactual decline in 1934 of about 28 percent 
in money base-a  massive nominal shock. 
The two  counterfactuals differ in what would have happened after 1935. In 
CF2 the impacts would have been small, since the revaluation in 1935 added 
almost a billion pesos to the gold backing, expanding it from 561 million paper 
pesos to 1,354 million. Arithmetically, this overnight “expansion”  of gold was Table 9.3. Model ofprices, Exchange Rates, and Interest Rates 
A. VAR  Model of  Exchange Rates and  Prices 
Dependent Variable  A In E  A In P 
Constant 
A In E(t-1) 
A In fit-1) 
A In M 




Mean of Dependent Variable 
Standard Error of Estimate 
0.11 (0.2)  -0.73  (1.6) 
0.02 (0.1)  0.30 (1.7) 
0.25 (1.6)  0.16 (1.1) 
-0.51 (1.6)  1.21 (4.2) 
-0.02 (0.2)  0.16 (1.6) 
0.04 (0.2)  -0.09 (0.6) 
56  56 
.15  .35 
0.02  0.02 
0.11  0.10 
Regression F(5,SO)  1.45  4.69 
B. Mishkin-Type Forecasf ofReaLInterest Rate 
Dependent Variable  f 
Constant 
A In M 
A In M(t-1) 
A In M(t-2) 
AlnY 
A In Y(t-1) 




A In p(t-1) 
A In P(t-2) 














Observations  54 
R-squared  .52 
Mean of Dependent Variable  3.46 
Standard Error of Estimate  10.42 
Regression F(5,SO)  3.20 
Notes andsources: See Appendix 1  and text. Sample  is annual data 18841941. Absolute t-statistics 
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enough to offset all of the unbacked domestic credit.?’  In CF1, conditions 
after 1935  would have been tougher. Absent revaluation, the path of reserves 
after 1935 would have been flat up to 1940. There would never have been a 
significant expansion of the money base to compensate for the almost one third 
decline after 1929. 
Figure 9.5 shows the paths for prices, exchange rates, and interest rates in 
the two counterfactuals, using the above estimated model.  The results show 
movements in the various variables that accord with intuition as regards the 
direction of 
1. Theprice /eve/. In 1929-33 prices showed a cumulative decline of about 
5 to 10 percent.  In the counterfactuals Argentina would have suffered 
a more severe and extended deflation in the early 1930s. Without re- 
discounting, the price level would have fallen about 40 percent, a sce- 
nario which would have prolonged deflationary expectations. In  the CF2, 
prices would have barely regained their 1929 price level after 1935 even 
with the huge gold revaluation. Significant pass-through of U.S. deflation 
could only just be offset by the revaluation. Worse still would have been 
the outcome without a revaluation: CF1 shows a persistent 10 percent 
decline in prices below the 1929  level, raising the question as to whether 
deflationary expectations would have ever been erased in the 1930s under 
the old regime. 
2. The nominalexchange rate. The exchange rate depreciated markedly after 
the end of convertibility in 1929, with a more than 50 percent loss of 
value by 1935. This development seriously undermined the credibility 
of a resumption at the prevailing par of 2.27.  Once par was unilaterally 
adjusted from 2.27 to 4.96 in May 1935 there was no turning back (Fig- 
ure 9.3).  Absent rediscounting, the exchange rate would have been 15 
to 20 percent stronger in 1931-34.3’  It is thus not clear whether, in the 
counterfactual world, agents would have been sure of a permanent regime 
shift. Without the revaluation of gold the mild depreciation would have 
persisted into the late 1930s, and, with it, the prospect of a deflation 
35. This followed from the peso’s loss of more than half its value relative to the old parity of 2.27. 
The “new” gold cover allowed the Central Bank to create an apparent reduction in domestic 
credit from 610 million pesos in December 1934 to just 293 million in December 1935 (see 
Table 9.1 and Figure 9.4).  Note that the money injection was not instantaneous, as can be 
seen from the monthly data, so, for the first couple of months of the Central Bank‘s existence 
domestic credit was actually negative-that  is, gold  and reserve backing at the new parity 
exceeded the outstanding money base: backing was more than 100 percent.  See Figure 9.4. 
36. Note that all fitted values are derived using one-step-ahead forecast-i.e.,  actual lagged values 
are used.  For the counterfactuals, dynamic forecast are used, where current fitted values are 
saved and used as future lagged values. 
37. This should not be dismissed as trivial: the reversibility, via deflation, of a 15 percent depre- 
ciation is a lot more plausible than the reversal of a 50 percent  depreciation.  Indeed, such 
movements in the paper-gold exchange rate had been reversed in the 1920s to permit resump- 
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to regain the old par, as in the 1920s. In contrast, the actual story for 
the exchange rate makes clear the regime shift.  Once the paper-gold 
exchange rate had risen into the range of 5 to 6, agents suspected that 
the government would not embark on a deflationary attack to reactivate 
the old regime. The costs, political and economic, would have been too 
high, and the action thus highly implausible. Instead, drawing on their 
own history, Argentines saw a parallel to the resumption in 1899 after the 
inflation of the 1890s, when a sufficiently large devaluation of the paper 
peso relative to gold (from 1.0 to 2.27) required a shift to a new parity to 
escape the deflation trap? 
3.  The realexchange rate. The real depreciation of 1929-31 is apparent, but 
the reversion to PPP is also clear in the figure. Further, the impact of mon- 
etary policy in the counterfactual experiments appears weak.  Certainly, 
without the rediscounts, there would have been less real depreciation after 
1931,  but only by 5 to 10  percent. Similarly,  after 1935,  the real exchange 
rate would have deviated little from its fitted value.  We conclude that 
the real exchange rate channel was only a weak conduit for the impact of 
Argentine monetary policy.39  So, does this imply that recovery was largely 
external in origin? And did Argentine policymakers have no real impact 
through their supposedly radical change of regime? We think not-but 
if the real exchange rate effects were weak, then we are forced to consider 
an alternative channel. 
4.  Real interest rates.  Real interest rates were high in 1929-31, at about 10 
percent.  Although nominal rates were much lower (Table 9.1), ex post 
deflation and ex ante expected deflation contributed to high real rates. 
The fitted real interest rate, an estimate of ex ante real interest rates con- 
structed using the Mishkin regression technique, adds to this sense of a 
deflationary regime before 1931.  The  turning point was the start of redis- 
counts. Absent this action by the Conversion Office the real interest rate 
would have risen dramatically to between 20 and 30 percent in the years 
1931-34, largely as a result of worsening deflation and persistence in the 
forecasting equation.  Such painfully high real interest rates would have 
had devastating effects on real activity, particularly investment, killing 
38. Or in the international context of the 1920s and 1930s, agents could look overseas for com- 
parisons in the event that orthodox thinking should return:  at 30WOO pesos a strategy akin 
to British deflation in the mid-1920s was conceivable, if a reversal of course was to be contem- 
plated. At over 500 pesos to the dollar, agents would see the situation as closer to the French 
scenario of the mid-l920s, with resumption at a new par or no resumption at all (but certainly 
no chance of resumption at the old par). 
39. This, in part, reflects the counterbalancing impacts of foreign monetary policy  in 1929-31. 
The  real and nominal exchange rate effects ofkgentina’s policy might be expected to be small, 
as compared to the much bigger effect of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. prices and exchange 
rates. In this view of the world, mistakes by the U.S. monetary authority helped other countries 
recover because of their enrich-thy-neighbor impact on real activity via the real exchange-rate 
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Figure 9.6. Real Interest Rates, Consumption,  and Investment, 1929-41 
------  Ex Ante Real Interest Rate (left axis) 
Private Consumption (right axis, 1929=100) 
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Notes and sources: See Appendix 1,  text, and Table 9.3. 
any chance of recovery.4”  In actuality investment recovery began in 1932 
(Table 9.1) just after real interest rates fell. 
Given the evidence from our model, we think the main impact of monetary 
policy change on recovery was in the years  1931-34,  when  the collapse of 
output was  reversed and recovery to the 1929 level of activity was  secured. 
This did not result from an explicit policy of real depreciation; movements 
in Argentine monetary policy were very small relative to changes in foreign 
(U.S.) monetary policy in this period.  Nor was the channel the credit market, 
and lower nominal interest rates, the so-called “Keynes”  effect; after all, nominal 
rates were low and had little to fall before hitting their floor. Rather, the channel 
was the elimination of deflationary expectations, or the so-called “Mundell” 
effect; after 1931, the fear of deflation was gone, expectations changed as the 
monetary regime shifted, and the institutional change began to look credible 
and permanent. 
Investigating the impact of monetary policies after 1933  in the United States, 
Romer (1992) found a marked correlation between declines in real interest 
rates, and recovery in investment and consumption activity.  She saw this as 
confirmation of the transmission mechanism from monetary policy to recovery 
via real interest rates.  In the same fashion, we display in Figure 9.6 the same 
40. Of  course, under CF2, alarge injection of money would still have ensued in 1935,  from the gold 
revaluation plan, and, proportionately this would have been much larger, as a fraction of the 
level of money base in 1935, than in the actual case, absent the rediscounts of 1931-34.  Thus, 
in CF2, there is one very big change in money base in 1935, enough to temporarily drive real 
interest rates very low for a year or two.  Absent the revaluation, in CF1, this effect disappears 
and real interest rates stay higher, although they do diminish finally in 1935-36  as a result of 
temporary gold inflows (see Table 9.1). Steering through the Great Depression  213 
variables for the Argentine case.  Exactly the same pattern is apparent:  after 
1931 ex ante real interest rates fell, and, as discussed, all of this movement is 
attributable to the reversal of deflationary expectations; at the same moment, 
consumption and investment began to recover, offering more evidence in favor 
of a “Mundell effect” interpretation. 
We think these results show strong support for the idea that the change in 
macroeconomic regime averted a serious depression in Argentina. However, in 
support of this hypothesis we might also seek more qualitative evidence that 
such a regime shift took place. 
What  Were They Thinking? 
In this section we first examine documentary evidence to see what popular 
opinion in newspapers and other reports has to say about the regime change. 
We then look back at the trade-off policymakers faced between external default 
on debts and internal default on convertibility, that is, the choice between fiscal 
and monetary orthodoy. 
Supporting Euidence: Tracking  the Crisis in Contemporary Reports 
To better document the perceptions of a change in regime we examined the 
accounts of contemporaries. Newspapers gave great emphasis to the decrees of 
December 5,1929 (the option to rediscount), and December 16,1929 (suspen- 
sion of convertibility,  referred to as “closure”  of the Conversion Office). Reports 
commented on the impact of gold flows on domestic economy and the inelas- 
tic relationship between money and gold.  A heated debate about suspension 
ensued.  Some observers considered the rediscount law acceptable, as long as 
it was not used to monetize deficits and was temporary.  Others thought the 
closure of the Conversion Office illegal. International reaction was not seen as 
negative since Argentina was able to close on new L5  million loan from Baring 
and Morgan, despite the sus~ension.~~ 
As the crisis mounted, attention turned to the fiscal problem.  Very soon it 
was appreciated that if the trade balance did not recover and future refinancing 
41. “Closure of Caja de Conversion,” Review ofthe River Phte (henceforth W),  December 20, 
1929, p.  9.  Alejandro E. Bunge, “The Rediscounting Faculty,” Rw:  December 20, 1929, p. 
11. “The Closure of the Caja de Conversi6n,” RRE:  December 20,1929, p.  19. Diego Ortiz 
Grognet, “Causes and Effects of The Closure of the Caja de Conversi6n;’ RRE:  December 
27, 1929, p.  13. Diego Ortiz Grognet, “Results ofThe  Closure of the Caja de Conversion,” 
RRE:  January 3, 1930, p.  11. Alejandro E. Bunge, “Gold Exports,” RRE:  January 10, 1930, 
p.  11.  Fortunato B. Arzeno, “The Caja de Conversion and the Rediscount Faculty,” RRI: 
January 17, 1930, p.  15. “The National Credit,” RRE:  December 27, 1929, p.  19. Guillermo 
E. Leguizamon, “Illegalidad e inconveniencia de la clausura de la Caja de Conversion,” Revirfa 
de Economia Argentina,  June 1931, p.  449. 214  Straining at the Anchor 
fell short, then gold would be used to avoid default and it would be desirable to 
sterilize the outflow: 
Everything tends to the belief that the international balance of payments may be unfa- 
vorable in 1930.. .. in consequence, it is of great importance to adopt from now onward, 
measures tending to reduce imports, to promote the introduction of foreign capital.. .  . 
In the regrettable event of the foregoing solutions not being adopted in adequate degree, 
it will be necessary to export more gold, possibly to the equivalent of some 200 million 
pesos paper.. .  .  In the event of this gold going out, it would be desirable to make use of 
the rediscount facility.. .42 
At the same time, pressure came from the banking sector to ease the liquidity 
crunch. The  Banco de la Nacion had already made abundant use of its rediscount 
provision in creating banking money to help other banks in distress.  Now it 
sought relief in the form of high-powered money via the Conversion Office’s 
own, hitherto unused, rediscount facility: 
At the moment when the moving of the crops and the usual end-of-year business habit- 
ually begin to require a larger quantity of notes in circulation, the private banks would 
not have been able to contribute adequately to supply them without detriment to their 
own relatively low supplies.. .  . It was indispensable to give them access to the resources 
of the Banco de la Naci6n by means of the rediscount of their commercial portfolios.. .  . 
Against this however, the situation of the bank itself was an obstacle, as its own cash 
holdings, reduced by the efflux of gold, could not be strained further.. .  . Hence the ne- 
cessity of permitting the rediscount of commercial bills at the Caja.. .and the petition in 
that sense presented to the Executive P0wer.4~ 
Thus, lobbying began to get the rediscount provision actually used. Still, no 
action was taken by the Radical government to employ it and nobody was sure 
the regime change would ha~pen.4~ 
Slowly, financial constraints tightened. A new loan of 50 million dollars was 
secured in April 1930,  but only for 6 months. It  was a short-term patch of the 
fiscal gap, and it failed to halt the depreciation.4’ By now pessimism was gath- 
ering steam; orthodox views were harder to maintain and the calls for central 
banking were  Observers saw through the gold standard’s “asymme- 
42. Alejandro E. Bunge, “The Fall in the Peso:  Loan Issues Abroad,” W  January 31, 1930, p. 
43. Banco de la Nacion Argentina, “The  Financial Year 1929,” W  February 21,1930,  p.  11. 
44. Some observers lobbied for a central bank as a solution but this required a long-range plan. 
Moreover, the Irigoyen administration was distracted,  confronting much bigger social and 
political problems in the year 1930. A rapid reaction was needed as attempts to plug the gap 
were getting desperate. “The  Monetary Question and Possible Answers,” RRI:  March 7,1930, 
p. 13. “From Conversion to Centralization? Will  Argentina  Join the World Movement toward 
Central Banking?” RRF:  April 11,1930, p.  15. 
19-23. 
45. WApril  11, 1930, p.  17. W  April 18,1930,  p. 7. 
46. Alejandro E. Bunge. “Argentine Money, Finance, and Balance of Payments: The  Outlook for 
1930,” Rlu:  June 20,1930, p.  11. “Central Banking and Currency Control: Gold Movements 
and Cash Reserves-Their  Aplication  [sic] to Argentine Conditions,” W  May 9, 1930, p. 
15. “Deserting the Gold Standard: Argentina’s Attitude toward Gold Movements,” W  May 
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try” and the adverse consequences of large-scale sterilizations by France and 
the United States. An early resumption began to seem unlikely and even once- 
conservative commentators such as the Review of  the River Plate started to see 
that reopening the Conversion Office would have disastrous con~equences.4~ 
Around the same time it became apparent that the deflation was having serious 
effects on business: 
If the risk-taking capital and the entrepreneurs’ reward are greatly reduced, this being 
the mainspring of our economic machine, business enterprise is grievously restricted. It 
is very difficult to get a forward business movement on a  fulling  price level. No doubt 
in the long run just as good business can be done upon one level as another, but it is the 
transition that works havoc. The object of greater stability is to avoid these 
In September, the Radical government of Irigoyen was deposed amid labor 
unrest and breakdown in the rule of law.  General Uriburu led a new govern- 
ment committed to sound policies to rebuild the economy. But there was still no 
change in monetary policy: the new Finance Minister thought any “fundamen- 
tal” change should await a subsequent, democratically elected go~ernment.4~ 
There was still no use of the rediscount law, and this remained so until April 
25, 1931.  Contemporary domestic and international reports saw this as the 
crucial turning point. On  the next day the most influential daily La Naridn led 
with the story on its front page under the headline “THE  REDISCOUNT UP 
TO 200,000,000 PESOS WAS AUTHORIZED,”  remarking that 
The measure was suggested by the business and commercial corporations to the gov- 
ernment. The government affirms that this is not to create new ventures but rather a 
definite means to regulate credit to avoid the sudden contraction of loans by banks.. .  . 
Undersecretary Prebisch added that this is an important step that the government has 
made to overcome the biggest defect in the prevailing monetary system, which is the 
rigid inelasticity of the volume of money in circulation. 
The Review of  the River Plate reflected the views of international business 
and led its next issue on May 1  with a story titled “Re-Discount Decreed.” A 
more optimistic outlook came the next week (May 8)  in an article “Inflation as 
a Remedy: Would it Help to Cure Trade Depression?” they cited the “recently 
granted re-discount facilities” and noted that “needless to say the main interest 
in connection with the whole idea of inflation is  centered upon its possible 
application to the remedy of the present state of world trade depression.. .” 
International opinions can also be detected in the Economist article of May 
47. “For while it is true that by  opening the Conversion  Office tomorrow exchange might be 
brought to close upon parity, the contraction in Argentine currency which would result might 
well prove catastrophic in its effects upon the general commercial movement in the country.” 
See “Gold and the Currency: Are Shipments Under Current Conditions Advisable?,” RRI: 
August 1, 1930, p. 29. 
48. “A Stable Price Level: Are Present Difficulties Really Due to Over-Production?,” W  August 
15, 1930, p. 13-15.  Emphasis as in the original. 
49. “The Government and the Caja,” M September 19, 1930, p. 9. 216  Straining at  the Anchor 
23 “Re-Discount Operations in Argentina” where the inflationary essence of 
the whole plan was applauded: 
Rediscount of commercial paper held by the Banco de la Nacion Argentina has already 
been effected with the Conversion Office.. ..  The backing is ample, and provide that all 
the safeguards governing the commercial paper are adhered to unflinchingly, the issue 
of additional money at the present moment will help the local situation. Nevertheless, 
it is undeniably inflation, and moreover, it undermines, be it by ever so little, the whole 
principle of Argentina’s currency legislation.. . 
We think it is apparent that contemporary observers, domestic and foreign, 
were in little doubt that Argentina had taken a bold “inflationary” step in April 
1931  in defiance of orthodoxy?’ 
Paths Not Taken: Why Not Just Default? 
Are our counterfactuals the relevant ones for study? One puzzle not addressed 
by our analysis is why Argentina did not choose some other counterfactual path. 
An obvious candidate would be the path chosen by so many other countries in 
Latin America:  default.  If Argentina had not used up gold to honor external 
obligations there would have been no need for sterilizations and the use of 
the rediscount facility. This would have eased fiscal tensions in the 1930s- 
and perhaps at a small cost? It has been argued that being a “good debtor” in 
the 1930s did not do Argentina much good in the long run:  in the postwar 
Argentina was treated no better than “bad debtors” in world markets:’ 
We have two responses to these observations.  First, more than any other 
country in the region, Argentina had bought into the idea of orthodoq ever 
since the painful attempt at stabilization during the 1890s Baring Crisis.  In 
that watershed event, the national government suspended any attempt to restore 
convertibility but stopped short of canceling service on debts, although munic- 
ipal and corporate issues were in a shameful default and had to be later assumed 
by the nation. As President Carlos Pellegrini declared during the negotiations: 
50. Of course, Prebsich never viewed the policy as inflationary,  rather antideflationary, in an attempt 
to stabilize prices in a specific historical situation. He  was always ready to dismiss as academic 
arguments that the policies might lead to inflation.  See his article “La inflaci6n escolastica 
y la moneda argentina” in the July 1934 issue of Revista de Economia Argentina.  In the long 
run, such inflationary tendencies were realized, but Prebisch resigned from the Central Bank 
in 1943 in objection to what he saw as a tendency to excessive money printing. 
51. See Lindert and Morton (1989);  Jorgensen and Sachs (1989);  Eichengreen and Portes (1989). 
However, the fact that Argentina was not treated better than defaulters in capital markets after 
1940 may not be a puzzle after all, because ceterisparibus did not apply.  Prior to the 1940s 
Argentina stood out as a bastion of orthodoxy and sound policies in Latin America. With the 
rise of Perh, and a shift to inward-looking  policies and price distortions, Argentina by  the 
1950s and 1960s looked like one ofthe worst places in Latin America for foreign investors, not 
one of the best, based on these objective economic criteria. Potential investors surely did not 
ignore these more immediate disincentives, whatever the repayment record decades prior. See 
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Not to have  serviced these debts with punctuality, the government would have had 
to declare the country bankrupt, producing such a terrible reaction in our European 
creditors that there would  not have been  limits to the general indignation directed 
against us, and they would have closed forever those markets, resulting in the shame of 
our nation and the rapid decadence of our social 
We think the same mentaliti persisted in the 1930s, “a conscious internal 
perception that satisfaction of debts was a ne~essity.”’~  Argentina believed it 
would be rewarded for good behavior, as Pellegrini believed in the 1890s. It is 
striking that in the contemporary press the subject of default is almost never 
raised, and the possibility was dismissed as remote: 
A precipitate return to parity is not, apparently,  intended and would not be desirable.. .  . 
The investor must, therefore, wait patiently for the financial and monetary reforms of 
the Provincial Government to fructi$.  This should not cause him any distress, since the 
service of the external debt of the Republic will be promptly effected and default, as far 
as the present Government is concerned, is ~nthinkable.5~ 
Second, although it is generally agreed that as a “good debtor” Argentina 
reaped no  long-run benefits after the 1940s,  the expost outcome  differed from ex 
ante beliefs. Moreover, beliefs that faithful debt service would be rewarded were 
correct, at least in the short run.  In the late 1930s,  Argentina obtained much 
better access to capital markets than defaulting countries. There were several 
refinancing loans, including 129 million dollar of 35-year external conversion 
bonds in 1937 and a 25 million dollar 10-year issue in 1938. And the terms of 
these later loans were good: 
The new issues yielded an average 4.7 percent when the U.S. rate on Baa corporate bonds 
hovered around 5.2 percent.. ..Thus Argentina’s good behavior did seem to earn it some 
return in easier credit access during the 1930s when capital markets were closed to most 
Latin American countries.5’ 
Sadly, the new loans flowed only briefly after the global crisis abated and 
before the Second World War. If such large-scale loans had been available in 
the early 1930s,  instead of the small refinancing secured, Argentina might have 
averted the substantial fiscal use of gold in 1929-35. 
The costs of deviating from the gold standard as a “contingent rule” were 
appreciated, as were the costs of default; capital markets could punish both 
kinds of deviance with higher costs of  Argentina understood the 
tradeoffs and had to make a choice. As in a model of public debt management, 
52. Quoted in Fishlow (1989, p. 99). 
53. Fishlow (1989, p. 99). 
54. Economist, March 14, 1931, p. 568. 
55. Data on loans and quotation from  Jorgensen and Sachs (1989, p. 75). It  could be that Argentina 
gained an increase in reputation by paying in exceptionally harsh external circumstances, giving 
a “positive surprise”  to its creditors. This is argued in a game theoretic model of reputation of 
capital-market access by Tomz (1998). 
56. On the contingent rule, see Bordo and Kydland (1995); Bordo and Rockoff (1996). 218  Straining at the Anchor 
the fiscal authority fixed the level of public debt and the monetary authority 
made the choice as to its composition as between bonds and money:57 
Increasing the rediscount limit and at the same time shipping gold to pay for the loan 
in question, means a reduction of the percentage of the metallic guarantee which Ar- 
gentina’s currency has hitherto enjoyed. It must not be forgotten, however, that even 
although this is in a sense equivalent to inflation, it has in its favour two very important 
points; in the first place, an external debt becomes an internal liability and secondly the 
actual amount of the currency in the hands of the public suffers, for the time being, little 
or no 
The most elegant feature of the Argentine  case is that once the country 
reached a “debt ceiling” the combination of an orthodox fiscal policy and a 
heterodox monetary policy satisfied the solvency (transversality) condition of 
the government budget constraint.  In an exceptional international crisis, Ar- 
gentina made a remarkably smooth transition to a fiduciary monetary regime 
while retaining creditworthiness in external capital markets. Although they had 
almost no degrees of freedom, such was the technocratic finesse of Prebisch and 
Pinedo. 
57. Sargent (1986). 
58. RRI:  August 28, 1931, p.  17. 